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CORPORATE BLOCKHOLDINGS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: 
A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
ABSTRACT 
Longitudinal studies indicate that toehold target economic performance persistently declines on 
average when interfirm equity investments are held for more than three years, while corporate 
blockholders economic performance temporarily improves. This study extends extant research 
by simultaneously examining the economic performance of both types of equity-associated firms 
using a multivariate approach. The study posits that average economic performance measures 
may mask performance trends associated with the toehold target's ownership structure and the 
form of trade relationship between the firms. Support for some contingency hypotheses suggests 
that economic performance may be influenced by the relationship between the equity associated 
firms. 
CORPORATE BLOCK.HOLDINGS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: 
A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
As business enterprise adapts to a global economy, interfirm collaboration has become a 
common means of sharing risks and exchanging scarce resources in order to gain competitive 
advantage vis a vis other firms (Chi, 1994; Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995). (For example, in 
1989 and 1990, more than 650 cross-border purchases of securities accounting for between 10 
and 50 percent of the toehold target's equity were completed among U.S., Japanese, and . 
European companies (Ipsen, 1991)).When collaboration such as technology partnerships (Doz, 
1988) and strategic alliances (McClenahen, 1987; Wachtler, 1988) occurs between large and small 
firms, it is common for the larger firm to buy and hold a block of stock in the smaller firm (the 
toehold target). Blockholdings constituting five to fifty percent of the toehold target's stock are 
interesting because they are difficult to justify theoretically (Schleifer & Vishny, 1986). For 
example, although a blockholder may have the voting power necessary to monitor toehold target 
managers, any monitoring costs they incur reduce their return. Huddart observes ( 1993: 1407), 
"A partial owner who fulfills the role of monitor under-invests in oversight because 
the product of his vigilance is divided pro rata among all stockholders, while he 
alone bears the cost. This public good problem raises the question: Why would 
anyone become a large shareholder when small shareholders earn identical returns, 
need not monitor, and can diversify?" 
If all shareholders earn identical returns per share, then large, active shareholders that 
incur monitoring costs earn a lower rate of return on their total investment than small, passive 
shareholders that do not. Moreover, a series of empirical event studies indicate that whe11 
corporate blockholdings representing between 5 and 50 percent ofa toehold target's common 
stock are held for more than three years, average toehold target performance persistently declines 
(Mikkelson & Ruback, 1985; Rosenstein & Rush, 1990). The negative toehold target 
performance trend associated with long-term corporate blockholdings is counterintuitive·because 
corporate managers are rewarded for increasing stockholder wealth, an impetus for restructuring 
investment and business portfolios. Therefore, it is implausible that corporations would hold onto 
large, poorly performing stock investments unless the apparent continuing economic losses 
associated with the toehold target's underperformance and monitoring costs are compensated for 
in some way. In this study, hypotheses predicting three possibilities for such compensation are 
theoretically developed and tested. 
This study posits that average long-term economic performance measures mask 
performance trends associated with control and trade variables that plausibly describe the 
relationship between the firms. The study extends McConnell and Servaes (1990) examination of 
ownership structure and performance because it uses an event study approach with abnormal 
returns as the dependent variable, instead of Tobin's Q, a cross sectional variable. Thus; there is 
less likelihood that the dependent variable may have influenced the independent variable~. The 
study also substantially extends Bogert's (1996) examination of the effect of minority level 
holdings on corporate blockholder performance because the model includes dummy vari'ables 
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reflecting an alternative explanation (restructuring}, the source of the shares, and perce~tage of 
ownership ranges that are associated with tax law and prior research (McConnell & Servaes, 
1990). Finally, it employs a multivariate approach to simultaneously test contingency hypotheses 
related to performance measures that reflect long time intervals using both toehold target and 
corporate blockholder abnormal returns. (According to the Motley Fool Internet websfte (1998), 
the efficient markets hypothesis suggests that stock prices reflect information about petformance 
expectations quickly, thus performance trends lasting more than a few days are an anomaly). 
Multivariate results supported by graphs that depict performance trends associated wit~ dummy 
variable values may provide the reader with greater confidence that the dummy variables did or 
did not influence the performance of the firm pairs in predicted ways. The next section develops 
theory to support the hypotheses and describes the model. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
First, between equity-linked firms, returns may vary with the source of the blockholding 
because private placement contracts may work to favor or copstrain a corporate blockholder in 
ways that do not affect blockholders that acquire shares from third parties. 
Second, returns may vary among shareholders in relation to the extent of their control and 
monitoring effort. In other words, a large ownership interest may enable a corporation to more 
successfully compete for private benefits that could enhance its return (Barclay & Holderness, 
1989). For example, in writing about technology partnerships that involve minority eqi,iity 
investments between large and small firms, Doz (1988: 32-33) states 
11 
••• a partnership is almost always partly competitive, the larger firm often 
attempting to capture the technology of the smaller one, to transfer it to its own 
operations, and ultimately appropriate it. Some managers in larger firms may also 
have minority equity investments as a transition step toward majority or full 
ownership, a threat to their smaller partner. Conversely, the smaller firm almost 
always tries to retain control over its technology, or over its replenishment, no 
matter what the intent of the larger firm: technology is, after all, the only 
bargaining strength of the smaller firm. This genuine competition within the 
partnership over what is contributed over time by each partner translates itself into 
hidden agendas. It may result in strategic conflict and strategic misrepresentation. 11 
Third, between equity-linked firms, returns may vary with the form of the trade 
relationship because there may be more opportunities to share transaction cost savings or transfer 
resources between vertically or horizontally related firms than between unrelated firms. An 
effective corporate strategy is one able to provide an economic return to investors. For a single 
firm, an effective corporate strategy has often been characterized as one that aligns the strengths 
and weaknesses of the firm with the opportunities, threats, and resources in its enviro11fI!ent. 
_ When one firm is partially owned by another, we posit the toehold target may be a source of 
tangible or intangible resources and the effects on the economic performance of both firms may be 
predicted in part by variables describing the toehold target's ownership structure and their trade 
relationship. 
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We assume that all parties to capital investment transactions are economically rational. 
We envisage that the level of corporate blockholder ownership and insider ownership of a toehold 
target, the source of a corporate blockholder' s shares, and the trade relationship between a 
corporate blockholder and its toehold target are contextual circumstances that affect the 
probability of a hostile change in control of the toehold target. We anticipate that the probability 
of a hostile change in control of the toehold target affects the simultaneous decisions of managers 
in corporate blockholder and toehold target corporations. If the contextual circumstances we 
· describe influence firm manager decisions and firm manager decisions influence firm performance, 
then the contextual circumstances may influence firm performance. 
Corporate Blockholder Ownership 
Agency theory posits that manager (agent) and stockholder (principal) interests may 
diverge to the extent that the managers do not own the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Accordingly, managers may choose an opportunistic decision alternative (such as consuming 
perquisites) that would reduce the performance of the firm if that alternative optimizes their 
interests. A corporation's board of directors is responsible for monitoring manager decisions and 
proscribing manager decisions that may be detrimental to stockholder interests. However, 
monitoring effort is costly, and only insiders (directors and corporate officers}, blockholders, and 
potential acquirers are likely to have sufficient motivation to monitor manager decisions closely. 
Motivation to maintain a blockholding is posited to be enhanced when a blockholder is in 
position to privately extract rents in addition to dividends and capital appreciation. For example, 
a blockholder with the financial capacity to effect a takeover may encourage toehold target 
managers to reduce their employment risk by permitting an ongoing private transfer of technology 
to the blockholder. A private transfer of technology (or any other economic resource) from a 
toehold target to a blockholder would enhance the blockholder' s return on its stock and 
monitoring investment, but ultimately reduce the return available to other toehold target 
shareholders, including the target's managers and its directors. 
It is implausible that toehold target managers would be willing to allow their firm's 
performance to be reduced iftheir jobs are secure because firm performance is usually associated 
with their compensation. However, personal circumstances such as low levels of target stock 
ownership may make the expected value of the ongoing transfer alternative optimal/or them. The 
dozens of targeted shareholder repurchase transactions that were ratified by directors in the 1980s 
is evidence that such circumstances sometimes exist (Kosnik, 1987). 
The ability of a corporate blockholder to extract rent from a toehold target may depend on 
whether the former has "effective" control of the latter. Effective control is associated with 20 to 
50 percent ownership in financial reporting guidelines (equity method) and tax law (dividend 
exclusion de!fuctions change at 20 percent ownership) (1990 U.S Master Tax Guide, 1989). 
Accordingly, we posit that a corporate blockholder that controls from 5 to 20 percent (a "low" 
minority level) of the toehold target's common stock is less able to extract rents from a toehold 
target than a corporate blockholder that controls from 20 to 50 percent (a "high" level in the 
minority range) ofa toehold target's common stock. (Hunger and Wheelen (1995:154) observe 
" ... by purchasing 20% of the common stock of In Focus Systems, Motorola guaranteed its 
access to In Focus's revolutionary technology and enabled Motorola to establish a joint venture 
with In Focus to manufacture flat-panel video displays"). 
Hypothesis 1. All else equal, the abnormal return means that occur when 
corporate blockholders hold from 5 to 20 percent of their toehold target's 
common stock will significantly differ from the abnormal return means that occur 
when corporate blockholders hold from 20 to 50 percent of their toehold target's 
common stock. 
Because private rent payments may reduce returns available to other toehold target 
investors, the extent of interests held by toehold target insiders or other blockholders may affect 
the ability of a long-term corporate blockholder to privately extract rents. A discussion of the 
motivation of each of these parties to monitor the toehold target managers follows. 
Toehold Target Insider Ownership 
Corporate officers and directors are considered to be "insiders" by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. The sum of their holdings is the extent of insider ownership. Extensive 
insider ownership tends to align the interest of managers and passive shareholders because 
perquisite consumption becomes less attractive to managers when they personally absorb a large 
fraction of perquisite costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Similar logic suggests that extensive insider ownership also ~akes perquisite payip.ents to 
others (i.e., blockholders) unattractive. We posit that unless there are contractual ties that limit 
the discretion of toehold target managers, a corporate blockholder's influence ultimately rests in 
its ability to threaten the tenure of toehold target managers through a proxy fight or hostile 
takeover. A proxy fight.threat is less credible when extensive insider ownership directly provides 
many shareholder votes friendly to incumbent managers (Dodd & Warner, 1983; Pound, 1988). 
A hostile takeover threat is also attenuated when extensive insider ownership, especially illllong 
outside directors (Kosnik, 1990), enables the toehold target managers to negotiate a larger 
takeover premium from the corporate blockholder and golden parachutes from their board. 
(Golden parachutes are perquisites that directly enrich toehold target managers at the expense of 
stockholders. They are sometimes justified because they motivate toehold target managers to 
release control to a bidder who is willing to pay a takeover premium that fully values the firm. 
Thus, golden parachutes associated with a takeover may also enrich selling stockholders stock 
stockholders at the expense of buying stockholders.) Both takeover premiums and golden 
parachutes increase the cost of a takeover to a bidding corporate blockholder and thereby reduce 
a takeover's potential return. 
Although a high level of insider ownership serves to inhibit the ability of corporate 
blockholders to extract rent from toehold targets, corporate blockholders may passively benefit 
from large investments in toehold targets that have a high level of insider ownership. Stulz (1988) 
argues that the premium that a hostile bidder must pay to gain control of a target firm increases as 
. the percentage of equity owned by managers increases, but the probability that the takeover will 
be completed decreases. When insiders own a small percentage of the shares outstanding, it is 
more likely that a hostile takeover will be completed at a premium that is less than the maximum 
the bidder is willing to pay. As the percentage of managerial equity ownership increases, the 
probability of a completed hostile takeover, for any given premium, declines so at 50 % 
managerial ownership, the probability of a hostile takeover is zero. 
This logic lead McConnell and Servaes (1990) to expect a curvilinear relation between the 
value ofa firm and the percentage of its shares owned by insiders. To test this theory, McConnell 
and Servaes plotted the relationship between Tobin's Q and the percentage of insider owrjership 
using two large cross-sectional samples reflecting 1976 and 1986 data. Both plots resembled 
gradual mound-shaped curvilinear relationships. In 1976, the inflection point when Tobin's Q 
was highest occurred when insider ownership was 49.4 percent. In 1986, the inflection point 
when Tobin's Q was highest occurred when insider ownership was 37.6 percent. 
Following McConnell and Servaes (1990), we also anticipate that a high level of firm 
value is associated with a high level of firm performance, and that high levels of firm performance 
will be associated with high levels of insider ownership. However, we define a "high level of 
toehold target insider ownership" to be from 35 percent to 50 percent and define "low toehold 
target insider ownership" to be any lower percentage. If high toehold target insider ownership is 
associated with high toehold target performance, then all shareholders, including corporate 
blockholders, may be expected to benefit from a level of insider ownership in that range. Thus, 
we predict that there are two situations when a corporate blockholder may expect to obtain a high 
return from a stock investment in a toehold target: (i) when the corporate blockholder' s level of 
ownership is high, or (ii) when toehold target insiders' level of ownership is high. 
The following two-by-two matrix summarizes these relationships. The low and high 
column and row descriptions refer to the levels of investment in the toehold target by the 
corporate blockholder and the toehold target management. The top right triangle within each cell 
shows the returns to the corporate blockholder, whereas the bottom left triangle shows the return 
to the target. We predict that both the corporate blockholder and the toehold target receive high 
returns ( +) when the level of toehold target insider ownership is high. Moreover, the corporate 
blockholder is expected to receive private rent at the expense of other toehold target shareholders 
when its level of ownership is high but the toehold target insider level of ownership is low. 
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Hypothesis 2. All else equal, the abnormal return means that occur when toehold 
target insiders own from 35 to 50 percent of the toehold target's common stock · 
will significantly differ from the abnormal return means that occur when toehold 
target insiders own less than 35 percent of the toehold target's common stock. 
Other Blockholders 
The ability of a blockholder to appropriate rent from a toehold target may depend on the 
extent of ownership held by "other blockholders" defined here as 5 percent or greater common 
stockholders who are neither toehold target insiders nor corporate blockholders that retained their 
investment more than three years. Predicting the motivation of these more transitory blo~kholders 
is problematic because they could act independently or in cooperation with either the long-term 
corporate blockholder or the toehold target insiders. Accordingly, we merely control for low 
(from 5 to 20 percent) or high (from 35 to 50 percent) levels of other blockholder ownership. 
Institutional Investors 
An increasing proportion of corporate equities is held by institutions. However, by 
restricting ownership structure variables in this study to insiders and blockholders ( own~rs of 5 to 
50 percent ofa toehold target's common stock), we eliminated the collective effect of institutional 
investors. We justify the omission of institutional investors from our model because most are 
limited to owning less than one percent of a corporation's equity by regulations or bylaws that are 
designed to encourage diversification. Moreover, research indicates that the average duration of 
an institution's stock investment is less than two years (Porter, 1992) and blockholders have been 
shown to provide more effective monitoring of managers than institutions (Brous & Kini, 1994). 
Private Placement 
A corporate blockholding may be purchased indirectly in open market transactions from one or 
more shareholders or directly in a private placement transaction with the toehold target firm. An 
open market transaction may appeal to a corporate blockholder because ownership rights come 
with no strings attached (e.g., a standstill agreement) that would limit the investing firm's options 
to earn an economic return. Accordingly, an investing firm might require an additional 
inducement to make a private placement attractive such as a large price discount, a super majority 
provision in the security that enhances the blockholder' s voting power on the board (Doz, 1988), 
or an opportunity to establish a long-term trade relationship with the issuing toehold target firm. 
(Private placements often occur in conjunction with a strategic alliance. According to Wachtler, 
(1988: 56), 
"In the most common strategic alliance, the investor receives between one-
twentieth and one-third of the target company's stock in return for its investment 
of cash and other services. The investing company intentionally does not take 
control of the smaller firm. It usually signs an agreement to obtain marketing, 
manufacturing, or other rights to the products or research and it enjoys a number 
of options for exiting or recouping its investment with a return." 
We view agreement clauses to obtain marketing, manufacturing, or other rights to the products or 
research of the toehold target as forms of private benefits.) 
The issuing toehold target corporation is likely to regard negotiated inducements as costs 
of issuing new shares. However, the net cost per share of a private placement may still be less 
than the net cost per share of making a public placement, particularly ifthe issuing corporation 
has performed poorly in the recent past or is not well known. Presumably, managers of both 
types of firms will only sign voluntary contracts that they believe enhance their personal interests. 
Accordingly, we anticipate that both parties to a private placement transaction expect.to benefit. 
Hypothesis 3. All else equal, the abnormal return means that are associated with 
a corporate blockholder 's acquisition of shares through a private placement will 
significantly differ from the abnormal return means that occur when a corporate 
blockholder acquires its shares from third party shareholders. 
Vertical Trade Relationship 
Arm's length trade relationships may be inefficient for a production network that requires 
specific investments. For example, specific investments undertaken by a pipeline company and a 
refinery may expose each party to the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the other. Dyer and 
Ouchi (1993: 56) note " ... [P]artner-specific investments create substantial buyer and supplier 
switching costs and, once made, make the two parties highly interdependent. This 
interdependence can create potential contracting problems if the parties do not completely trust 
each other". Minority-level equity investment is a governance mechanism that can be expected to 
reduce the benefits of opportunistic behavior because, if the toehold target performs badly, both 
sets of stockholders suffer loss. Accordingly, when long-term contracts are bonded by long-term 
minority-level equity investments, firms may be more likely to mutually benefit. 
Hypothesis 4. The abnormal return means that are associated with a vertical 
trade relationship between the corporate blockholder and toehold target firms 
will significantly differ from the abnormal return means that occur when a trade 
relationship is not vertical. 
Horizontal Trade Relationship 
Firms often link with firms in the same industry to share risk in technology development or 
to extend global reach. For example, France's Groupe Bull acquired 19.9 percent of Packard Bell 
Electronics in order to access its U.S. retail distribution system (Armstrong, 1993). (For example, 
in 1989 and 1990, more than 650 cross-border purchases of securities accounting for between 10 
and 50 percent of the toehold target's equity were completed among U.S., Japanese, and: 
European companies (Ipsen, 1991)). If the corporate blockholder distributes the additional 
products through the distribution channels of the toehold target and the products are directed 
toward a different set of customer needs, then this relationship may be mutually beneficial. 
Alternately, ifthe corporate blockholder invests in a competitor in order to hinder it, learn from it, 
or extract cash from it through management contracts (Ipsen, 1991), the intended outcome may 
be win/lose. Because both win/win and win/lose outcomes are plausible, we make only an 
exploratory prediction that performance means will differ if a horizontal trade relationship with a 
direct competitor exists. 
Hypothesis 5. The abnormal return means that are associated with a horizontal 
trade relationship between the firms will significantly differ from the abnormal 
return means that occur when a trade relationship is not horizontal. 
Unrelated Toehold Targets 
Corporations may also invest in firms that are neither customers nor suppliers nor direct 
competitors to access the toehold targets' proprietary technologies (Grant, 1993). For example, 
Microsoft recently announced a strategy of actively seeking minority stakes in a variety of 
' multimedia ventures for various technological purposes (Zachary, 1993). Although firms may not 
. 
be linked at the time of the purchase of a block of stock, the transfer of technology could signal 
future competition within an industry. 
Other Influences 
Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) found that during the 1980s, blockholder ownership was 
significantly associated with corporate restructuring, which suggests that many managers 
restructured their operations only when pressured to do so by large shareholders. Many firms in 
those years apparently restructured to unwind the "negative synergy" that sometimes resulted 
from mergers that occurred during the 196.0s (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). Negative synergy exists 
when the market value of a multidivisional firm is worth less than the sum of the market values of 
its subsidiaries. Therefore, shareholder value can be created by divesting businesses that do not 
"fit" and by reducing unnecessary corporate overhead (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). Because this 
study' s sample is composed of firms associated by corporate blockholdings during the mid-
1980' s, we control for toehold target divestiture. (A negative firm performance trend, s~ch as the 
toehold target trend identified by Mikkelson and Ru back ( 1985), could also reflect an unrelated 
prior cause that has nothing to do with a corporate blockholding (Walsh & Kosnik, 1993) or 
negative synergy. However, we did not control for prior period firm performance because several 
of the sample firms were not publicly traded 18 months before the purchase announcement.) 
The extent of performance change in the corporate blockholder is likely to be associated 
with the relative size of the asset. We control for this possibility by including in the model an 
investment size ratio that is computed by dividing the value of the blockholding investment by the 
value of the corporate blockholder. All else equal, the larger the investment size ratio, the larger 
is the expected change in the corporate blockholder' s performance. 
Proposed Multivariate Model 
Each of the variables described above plausibly could affect the performance of the 
corporate blockholder or its toehold target. FIGURE 2 models the predicted relationships 
between the dependent performance variables and the independent variables. In addition, a link is 
drawn between toehold target performance and corporate blockholder performance variables to 
reflect the transfer of pro rata financial returns (dividends and capital appreciation) and anticipated 
private benefits to the corporate blockholder. 
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The sample was composed oflong-term corporate blockholder and toehold target firm 
pairs where the former owned from 5 up to 50 fifty percent of the common stock of the latter for 
at least three years between 1982 and 1988. (The Williams Amendment to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 requires investors to make initial public disclosure of their percentage of 
ownership with I 0 days of their accumulation of security interests that provide five per~ent or 
greater control of a U.S. corporation. Thereafter, Form 13Ds must be filed whenever t)le 
ownership stake varies by more than 2 percent (Securities Exchange Commission, 1989)). 
The time interval examined for this research is appropriate because in recent yea'.rs many 
corporations have made their block purchases through unquoted subsidiaries to avoid public 
scrutiny and to increase their flexibility in dealing with minority holdings (Ipsen, 1991 ). To 
' identify the sample, the Securities Exchange Commission's News Digest (I 982- l 985a) was 
examined for initial listings of Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 13D filings. (In 
recent years, the News Digest does not report initial Form 13D filings). Next, abstracts in The 
Wall Street Journal Index (1981-1984) and some prior-year proxies were examined to exclude 
Form 13D filings that merely reflected revisions of previously filed Form 13Ds. Then, Spectrum V 
(1982-1988) was examined to exclude observations that involved toehold target insiders with 
ownership greater than fifty percent or corporate blockholders that held less than five percent or 
more than fifty percent of the toehold target's common stock during the three years that followed 
the initial Form 13D filing. Finally, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) master file 
listings (1990) were examined to exclude firms that did not have complete return data for the 
three year time interval. Eighty-one firm pairs were identified that met the sample criteria and had 
complete return, stock price, and shares outstanding data. 
The existence or absence of a vertical trade relationship, a horizontal trade relationship, or 
a private placement was ascertained through a mail and phone survey of sample firm financial 
executives. Responses were obtained for forty-eight of the pairs. Other independent variable data 
were obtained from archival sources. · 
Variable Measures 
The dependent variable for each sample firm was a holding period abnormal return, a 
measure of firm economic performance. The abnormal return measures relate to a time interval 
that began the day prior to the initial Form 13D filing (to capture information leakage) and 
continued for 382 trading days, about eighteen months. Eighteen months is half of the minimum 
three-year holding period that defines the corporate blockholders, an interval that is plausibly long 
enough to allow a corporate blockholder to realize private benefits such as technology transfer. 
To compute the abnormal returns, daily total return and corresponding daily size-based 
decile index total return values were drawn from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
tapes of trading activity on the NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges (1990) for each trading 
day in the specified time interval. Then, a firm's daily total returns and the index's daily total 
returns were separately compounded. Finally, the compounded index return was subtracted from 
the compounded firm return to compute the firm's abnormal total return for the time interval. 
(More computation detail is provided in the Appendix.) 
One of the 48 pairs included a corporate blockholder with an abnormal return ~ore than 
four standard deviations greater than the mean. We decided to exclude the firm and its 1toehold 
I 
target from the sample to make the distribution of abnormal returns less positively skewed and 
plausibly more generalizable. Thus, 47 firm pairs (58 percent of the original 81 pair) comprised 
the sample used for multivariate hypotheses tests. 
There were several independent variables. For each pair affirms, the ownership 'Structure 
measures were derived from percentages disclosed in a toehold target annual proxy. Proxies 
disclose the percentage of ownership held by blockholders that own five percent or more of the 
corporation and officers and directors of the firm (Securities Exchange Commission, 1989b). The 
proxies that were selected were dated as closely as possible to a date eighteen months after the 
corporate blockholder's initial Form 13D filing to coincide with the abnormal return time interval. 
Long-term corporate blockholders held from 5 to 50 percent of the toehold target for at.least 
three years during the years 1982 through 1988. Other blockholders were five percent or greater 
common stockholders that could not be classified as toehold target officers and directors or long-
term corporate blockholders. (Other corporate blockholders were classified as "other 
blockholders" iftheir ownership lasted less than three years). Officers and directors in this study 
are defined to be toehold target insiders. 
The independent variable values of each corporate blockholder and its toehold target were 
coded the same because they share a relationship. If the extent ofa corporate blockholder's 
ownership in the toehold target was at least 5 percent but less than 20 percent, then the "low 
corporate blockholder ownership" variable was coded one; if at least 20 but less than 50, percent, 
then zero. If the extent of insider ownership in the toehold target was at least 35 percent but less 
than 50 percent, then the "high toehold target insider ownership" variable was coded one; ifless 
than 35 percent, then zero. If the extent of other blockholder ownership in the toehold target was 
at least 5 percent but less than 20 percent, then the "low other blockholder ownership" variable 
was coded one; ifbetween 20 and 50 percent, then zero. If the extent of other blockholder 
ownership was at least 35 percent but less than 50 percent, then the "high other blockholder 
ownership" variable was coded one; ifless than 3 5 percent, then zero. 
To identify whether or not the corporate blockholders and toehold targets were vertically 
related, horizontally related, umelated, or associated through· a private placement, financial 
executives in the sample firms were contacted through a mail and phone survey. If a 
customer/supplier or supplier/customer trade relationship existed between the corporate 
blockholder and the toehold target during the period of ownership, then the "vertical trade 
relationship" variable was coded one, otherwise zero. If a direct competitor trade relationship 
existed between the corporate blockholder and the toehold target during the period of ownership, 
then the "horizontal trade relationship" variable was coded one, otherwise zero. If the corporate 
blockholder's stock was acquired directly from the toehold target, then the "private placement" 
variable was coded one, otherwise zero. To identify toehold targets that announced subsidiary 
divestitures, abstracts in The Wall Street Journal Index (1982-1987) were examined. If the 
toehold target disclosed a divestiture in the eighteen-month time interval, then the "toehold target 
divestiture" variable was coded one, otherwise zero. 
To relate the size of the corporate blockholder's investment in the toehold target to the 
size of the corporate blockholder, a ratio was estimated. The "investment size ratio" was 
computed by multiplying the corporate blockholder' s percentage of ownership in the toehold 
target (disclosed on the "18~month" toehold target proxy) by the toehold target's comm.on stock 
market value. Then, that product was divided by the corporate blockholder' s common ~tock 
market value. The common stock market values were both computed by multiplying the number 
of each firm's common shares outstanding by the firm's closing share price on the trading day 
preceding the initial Form 13D filing. (The common stock market value means of the corporate 
blockholders and toehold targets were $1,908 million and $309 million, respectively. The 
common stock market value standard deviations were $4,055 million and $718 million, · 
respectively.) 
Analysis 
The model at FIGURE 2 shows a link between the dependent performance variables that indicate 
the performance variable measures are interdependent. Interdependent dependent variables 
require a multivariate analysis to simultaneously measure the effect of the independent categorical 
variables on the dependent variables. Simultaneous testing controls for the possibility of Type I 
error inflation that may occur when separate univariate tests are made independently on 
dependent variables that are not perfectly correlated (Hair, Anderson, & Tatham, 1987: 150). 
(Consider, for example, a model with four dependent variables and assume a 5 percent level of 
statistical significance. With no differences in the dependent variables, one would expect to 
observe a significant effect on a dependent variable 5 percent of the time. However, across the 
four separate tests, the probability of a Type 1 error will range between 5 percent when the 
dependent variables are perfectly correlated and 19 percent (1-.95**4=. 19) when the dependent 
variables are not correlated.) 
To test whether the categorical independent variables in our model affect both dependent 
variables simultaneously, multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOV A) was applied. 
MANCOV A is appropriate when there are two or more continuous dependent variables, one or 
more categorical independent variables, and at least one uncontrolled metric covariate. 
MANCOV A determines if samples came from populations with equal means. In MANCOV A, 
the covariate(s) enters the model first to partial out its variance before measuring the variance 
associated with the hypothesized variables. After adjusting for the effect of the covariate(s), a 
standard MANOV A is carried out. The multivariate procedure provides more sensitive tests of 
categorical variable effects because the F tests consider the correlation between the dependent 
variables which is part of the total information available for assessing the overall group 
differences. However, the multivariate results are not helpful in ascertaining the direction of the 
categorical variable effects. ' 
To ascertrun the direction of the categorical variable effects, we also report multivariate 
Ordinary Least Squares and univariate Weighted Least Squares regressions on the dependent 
variables taken separately. We also show graphically the effect of each of the hypothesized 
variables on each of the dependent variables over time. 
RESULTS 
TABLE I reports means, standard deviations, and the correlations among the variables. 
The abnormal return means of the corporate blockholders (9.58 %) and toehold targets (-9.82 %) 
have similar magnitude, but different signs. Tests of the abnormal return means indicate that they 
do not significantly differ from zero. The abnormal return medians (not shown) are less: than the 
means for both the corporate blockholders (2.35 %) and for the toehold targets (-21.92'Yo) which 
indicates both abnormal return distributions are positively skewed. (The skewness mea$Jres for 
the distributions are 1.00 and 0. 75, respectively, and the kurtosis measures for the distributions 
are 1.12 and 3 .04, respectively). In contrast to the differing signs associated with the 
performance means and medians, the correlation between the dependent variables (.23, p<.12) is 
positive which indicates that the dependent variables of firm pairs move in the same direction 
some of the time. 
The investment size ratio correlation with corporate blockholder performance (.25, p<.09) 
is significant at the .1 level, which suggests it is marginally effective as a covariate for the 
corporate blockholder dependent variable. The investment size ratio correlation with the toehold 
target dependent variable is also positive (.16), but not significant. Thus, the investment ,size ratio 
partials out some variance in the positively correlated dependent variables, but not a lot. , We 
retain the investment size ratio variable in the model to estimate more robust statistics. · 
Test Results and Interpretation of Related Statistics 
TABLE 2 reports multivariate tests of association for the five hypothesized varial;>les in 
the model described at FIGURE 2. The null hypotheses we test are that the two vectors of means 
associated with the dependent variables are equivalent across the various levels of each of the 
categorical independent variables. In other words, the categorical variables have no effect on 
either the corporate blockholder' s abnormal returns or the toehold target's abnormal returns. The 
null hypotheses may be rejected if the means of the groups identified by categorical independent 
variables are significantly different. Wilk's Lambda is a statistic that gets smaller as the between-
group dispersion gets larger (i.e., the smaller the Wilk's Lambda, the greater the implied , 
significance). Wilk's Lambda can be transformed into a good approximation ofanF statistic to 
test its statistical significance (Rao, 1978). TABLE 2 also shows stepdown analysis, where the 
effect of the c·ategorical variables on each of the dependent variables is analyzed separately. 
Because the step down F s do not indicate the direction of effect, we choose to discuss regression 
statistics found at TABLE 3 along with the MANCOV A statistics in this section. Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression residuals were tested to ascertain whether they are normally distributed 
and reflect equal variances, assumptions which are also underlie MANCOV A analysis. (Statistical 
research suggests that AN OVA F tests are robust with regard to violations of normality 
assumptions except in extreme cases (Meyers, 1975; Winer, 1962). We assume MANCOVA 
should be similar because it is nothing more than ANOV A applied to two or more dependent 
variables with a covariate.) 
Although the tests indicate OLS estimates are acceptable, we recognize that the dependent 
variable distributions are positively skewed. (The Jarque-Bera Asymptotic Lagrange Multiplier 
Normality tests for the corporate blockholders and toehold targets produce chi-squares of 1.1943 
with 2 degrees of freedom and 4.9788 with two degrees of freedom, respectively. These 
statistics are less than the chi-square table value whic:f suggests the residuals are distributed 
normally (White, 1993: 20). The Harvey test (LogE on X) for multiplicative heteroskedasticity 
produces chi-squares of9.275 with 9 degrees of freedom and 12.575 with 9 degrees of freedom, 
respectively. These statistics are also less than the chi-squares table value which suggests that the 
extent ofheteroskedasticity is in an acceptable range (White, 1993: 176)). Accordingly,.for 
comparison we also report univariate two-stage Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression 
results because the WLS estimation technique fits the model more precisely by underweighting the 
OLS outliers. 
Finally, to help shed additional light on the effects of the categorical independent variables 
on the performance of corporate blockholders and their toehold targets over time, we also present 
the significant hypothesized relationships graphically. The abnormal return means of the 
• 
corporate blockholders and toehold targets at 6, 12, and 18 month time intervals are illustrated at 
FIGUREs 3 through 7. The graphical relationships need to be interpreted with care be~ause they 
do not represent equal sample sizes and they do not take into account the effects of the other 
independent variables. On the other hand, agreement between the significance of the multivariate 
Fs, the step down F s, the regression parameter estimate signs and t-statistics, and the graphs 
should provide an intuitive sense of the posited theory's accuracy. 
At TABLE 2, the low corporate blockholder ownership Wilk's Lambda (0.79) is 
significant (F=4.72,p <0.02) which indicates that the variable explains a significant amount of the 
variance in the dependent variate. This result supports Hypothesis 1: all else equal, the abnormal 
return means that occur when corporate blockholders hold from 5 to 20 percent of their toehold 
target's common stock will significantly differ from the abnormal return means that occur when 
corporate blockholders hold from 20 to 50 percent of their toehold target's common stock. In 
the corresponding stepdown analysis, the F values indicate that the dependent variate is affected 
through the Corporate Blockholder abnormal returns (F=6.83, p<0.01) but not the Toehold 
Target abnormal returns (F=2.44, p<0.13). At TABLE 3, the corporate blockholders' low 
corporate blockholder ownership OLS parameter estimate (-48.09, t=-2.61) indicates that when 
corporate blockholders own less than a 20 percent stake in the toehold target, they perform 
significantly worse than when they own from 20 to 50 percent. Alternately, the toehold targets' 
low corporate blockholder ownership OLS parameter estimate (36.55, t=l.56) indicates that 
when corporate blockholders own less than a 20 percent stake in the toehold target, the toehold 
targets perform better, but not significantly better, than when corporate blockholders own from 
20 to 50 percent. (On the other hand, the toehold targets' WLS parameter estimate is positive 
and significant: 55.10, t=2.33). FIGURE 3 shows the abnormal return means for the corporate 
blockholders and toehold targets associated with low and higher percentage levels of corporate 
blockholder ownership. As predicted, the graph indicates the ability of a corporate blpckholder to 
extract private rent from a toehold target depends on the magnitude of its ownership in the 
toehold target. Moreover, the graph suggests that when corporate blockholder' s own from 20 to 
50 percent they gain a lot, and when they own from 5 to 20 percent, they lose relatively little. 
Consistently, the toehold target's abnormal return means decline more rapidly when corporate 
blockholder ownership is at or above 20 percent than when corporate blockholder ownership is 
below 20 percent. These results help explain why corporations may be willing to become and 
remain large, monitoring shareholders: corporate blockholders continue to monitor when and 
because they are compensated for doing so. 
****************************************************************************** 
Put FIGURE 3 about here 
****************************************************************************** 
At TABLE 2, the high insider ownership Wilk's Lambda (0.76) is significant (F=5.69, 
p<0.01). This result supports Hypothesis 2: all else equal, the abnormal return mears that occur 
when toehold target insiders own from 35 to 50 percent of the toehold target's cominon stock 
will significantly differ from the abnormal return means that occur when toehold target insiders 
own less than 35 percent of the toehold target's common stock The corresponding stepdown 
• 
analysis shows that high insider ownership influences the dependent variate through both the 
corporate blockholder and toehold target dependent variables (F=4.73,p<0.04; F=7.52,p<O.Ol). 
At TABLE 3, both the corporate blockholders' and the toehold targets' high insider ownership 
OLS parameter estimates are positive and significant (49.25, t=2.18; 78.90, t=2.74) which 
indicates that when toehold target insiders own from 35 to 50 percent of the toehold target's 
common stock, both groups perform significantly better. FIGURE 4 shows the corporate 
blockholder abnormal return means associated with toehold target insider ownership of 3 5 percent 
or more are higher than the corporate blockholder abnormal return means associated with insider 
ownership that is less than 3 5 percent. These performance results are consistent with agency 
theory and Stulz' s takeover model. 
****************************************************************************** 
Put FIGURE 4 about here 
****************************************************************************** 
At TABLE 2, the private placement Wilk's Lambda (0.99) is not significant (F=0.22, 
p<0.81) which indicates the variable has no effect on the dependent variate. Private placement 
also does not affect either of the dependent variables (F=0.15, p<0.70; F=0.29, p<0.59). Thus, 
there is no support for Hypothesis 3. 
At TABLE 2, the vertical trade relationship Wilk's Lambda (0.73) is significant (F=6.62, 
p<0.00) as are the effects on both of the dependent variables (F=7.13, p<O.OI; F=7. I5,p<O.OI). 
This result supports Hypothesis 4: the abnormal return means that are associated with a vertical 
trade relationship between the corporate blockholder and toehold target firms will significantly 
differ from the abnormal return means that occur when a trade relationship is not vertical At 
TABLE 3, both the corporate blockholders' and the toehold targets' vertical trade relationship 
OLS parameter estimates are positive and significant (51.01, t=2.67; 64.94, t=2.67) which 
indicates that when a customer/supplier relationship exists between a corporate blockholder and a 
toehold target, both tend to perform better. FIGURE 5 shows that a vertical trade rela~ionship is 
associated with higher corporate blockholder and toehold target abnormal return means than 
abnormal return means associated with no vertical (or horizontal) trade relationship. These 
results are consistent with transaction cost theory that suggests that firms that rely on each other 
through long-term contracts are more likely to attenuate opportunism and experience a win/win 
outcome if they adopt an appropriate governance mechanism to bond their relationship and align 
their mutual interests. The 18-month abnormal return means of unrelated corporate blockholders 
and unrelated toehold targets was 4 percent and -20 percent, respectively. 
****************************************************************************** 
Put FIGURE 5 about here 
****************************************************************************** 
At TABLE 2, the horizontal trade relationship Wilk's Lambda (0.90) is not significant 
(F=2.03, p<0.14) although the variable does explain a marginally significant extent of the 
variation in the toehold target dependent variable (F=3.08, p<0.09). Hypothesis 5 is not strongly 
supported, but it is interesting to observe that at TABLE 3 the parameter estimate of the toehold 
targets (55.50) is positive (t=l.75), whereas the parameter estimate of the corporate blockholders 
is insignificantly negative. 
The results in TABLE 2 take into account four control variables that are not shown. The 
investment size ratio is a continuous covariate that relates the size of the corporate blockholder' s 
investment in the toehold target to the size of the corporate blockholder. The investment size 
ratio that relates the value of investment to the value of the blockholder did not have a significant 
effect on the dependent variate (Wilk's Lambda=.91; F=l.1S;p<O.l9). The toehold target 
divestiture variable that indicates whether the toehold target divested a subsidiary during the 18-
month time interval did not have a significant effect on the dependent variate (Wilk' s 
Lambda=.89; F=2.20, p<0.13). The high other blockholder ownership variable that indicates if 
other blockholders held at least 3 5 percent of the toehold target's common stock had a significant 
effect on the dependent variate (Wilk's Lambda=.72; F=7.12,p<O.OO). The regressions at 
TABLE 3 indicate that most of the effect of high other blockholder ownership was on.the 
abnormal returns of the corporate blockholders. The low other blockholder ownership variable 
that indicates if other blockholders held less than 20 percent ownership in the toehold target also 
had a significant effect on the dependent variate (Wilk's Lambda=. 73; F=6.60, p<0.00). The 
regressions at TABLE 3 suggest that the effect oflow other blockholder ownership was 
significant on the abnormal returns of both the corporate blockholders and the toehold targets. 
DISCUSSION 
A body ofliterature has examined the effect of interfirm equity interests on the· 
performance of corporations. In recent years, the scope of that literature has broade1,1ed from a 
focus on majority interests, where an investing firm attains absolute control over a target, to one 
that includes minority interests, where the investing firm may settle for influence over a toehold 
target managers (Niederkofler, 1991). Minority interests have become popular domestic and 
international governance mechanisms (Ipsen, 1991) to bond technology partnerships (Doz, 1988) 
and strategic alliances (Wachtler, 1988) that are developed to accomplish long-term goals 
cooperatively. They represent an intermediate governance structure between complete vertical 
financial ownership and vertical contracting that is useful because of the existence of positive 
agency and transaction costs (Mahoney, 1992). Yet despite the importance of minority interests 
to these cooperative strategies, few studies have examined the effect of minority ownership on the 
performance oflong-term corporate blockholders and toehold targets simultaneously. Moreover, 
previous studies have either focused on short time intervals or used univariate analyses 
exclusively. To the extent that the performance of corporate blockholders and toehold targets is 
interrelated, univariate analyses may be misleading. In this study, a nearly significant positive 
correlation (.23, p<.12) between 18-month corporate blockholder and toehold target performance 
measures justified the consideration of multivariate analyses. 
Findings 
Overall, we found considerable support for hypotheses that predicted that the level of 
long-term corporate blockholder ownership, the level of toehold target insider ownership, and the 
existence of a vertical trade relationship simultaneously affect the performance of both ~orporate 
blockholders and toehold targets. We did not find support for hypotheses that predicted private 
placement or other trade relationship (horizontal or unrelated) variables affect performance. 
When minority level corporate blockholders hold from 20 to 50 percent of their, toehold 
target's common stock, the corporate blockholders perform better and the toehold targets 
perform marginally worse. The divergent performance relationship directly supports the wealth 
transfer hypothesis of Rosenstein and Rush (1990) and suggests that corporate blockholder 
ownership in that range may be sufficient to enable corporate blockholders to secure private 
benefits or at least monitoring compensation from toehold targets at the expense of other toehold 
target shareholders. 
Alternately, when insiders own from 35 to 50 percent of the toehold target's common 
stock, corporate blockholders and toehold targets both perform better than when insiders own 
less than 3 5 percent. Insider control plausibly attenuates perquisite payments and enables the 
management to focus on implementing long-term strategies to optimize toehold target returns to 
all shareholders. The association of high insider ownership with high performance is consistent 
with the observation by McConnell and Servaes (1990) of high insider ownership with high firm 
value. 
The existence of a vertical trade relationship between the corporate blockholder and the 
toehold target is also positively associated with the performance of both types of firms. Thus, a 
high level of insider ownership and a vertical relationship are both circumstances associated with 
win/win outcomes for both long-term corporate blockholders and their toehold targets._ 
Finally, among the control variables, we observed that other blockholder ownership in the 
5 to 20 percent range as well as the 35 to 50 percent range is positively associated with improved 
corporate blockholder and toehold target. A possible explanation is at an intermediate level of 
ownership, conflict between blockholders over control interferes with enhanced corporate 
blockholder or toehold target performance. Further research is needed to examine this question. 
Study Limitations 
Two aspects of the study justify caution in interpreting the results. First, abnormal returns 
measured over long time intervals may reflect confounding events. In longitudinal research, the 
choice of the length of the time interval to examine is somewhat arbitrary and may affect the 
research conclusions. In this study, we assumed that the performance effects of other events 
canceled themselves out, and to mitigate the effects of confounding events, we choose a time 
interval half as long as the 3-year minimum ownership duration used to select the sample. In 
future research, it may be useful to drop the 3-year minimum ownership duration constraint that is 
associated with negative toehold target performance (Mikkelson & Ruback, 1985; Rosenstein & 
Rush, 1990) in order to observe a larger sample. 
Second, we lack a control sample for the corporate blockholders and the toehold targets. 
This reflects the fact that it is difficult to isolate a sample of small firms that do not have a 
corporate or other blockholders among the shareholders in a three-year time interval. A 
multivariate study with matched pair control samples would be a preferred design to eli!Jrinate 
some alternative explanations for the performance trends if such a sample can be obtain~d. 
• 
Conclusions 
Many corporations buy and hold significant minority-level equity interests other 
corporations even though such investments do not provide absolute control. This studyiidentifies 
two circumstances when that corporate investment strategy is associated with improvedlcorporate 
blockholder and toehold target performance and one circumstance when the strategy is associated 
with improved corporate blockholder performance and reduced toehold target performance. 
Toehold target ownership structure and the form of the trade relationship between a 
corporate blockholder and its toehold target were found to explain considerable variance in 18-
month abnormal returns. Other things equal, when insiders owned from 35 to. 50 percent of the 
toehold target's stock, the performance of both the toehold targets and the corporate 
blockholders was significantly higher than when insiders owned less than 3 5 percent. Similarly, 
when a vertical trade relationship existed between the firms, the performance of both the toehold 
targets and the corporate blockholders was significantly higher than when the trade relationship 
was not vertical. Alternately, when corporate blockholders owned from 20 to 50 percent of the 
toehold targets, corporate blockholders performed significantly better than when they owned from 
5 to 20 percent. Taken as a whole, the results suggest that corporate blockholdings seem to 
endure when they serve to enhance or maintain corporate blockholder performance. 
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This study computes abnormal return estimates of each firm's economic performiµice 
during specified time intervals using a methodology that employs compounding, size-bas~d 
indices, and the market adjusted model. 
Compounding 
A holding period return (HPR) is determined by compounding k consecutive daily or 
monthly single period returns in a time interval corresponding to the holding period (s, t)' as 
follows, 
"HPR(k) = (1 +R1) (1 +R2) ... (l +Rk)-1" 
Holding period returns are less biased than accumulated (summed) returns in long time 
intervals (Conrad & Kaul, 1993: 47). 
Size-based decile indices 
Dimson and Marsh (1986) demonstrated that firms of-similar size have returns that 
generally move together. Therefore, in circumstances where estimation periods are long and 
event securities differ systematically in size and weighting from market index constituents, they 
argue it is better to measure abnormal stock price performance by comparing each firm's returns 
with the returns of an index composed of similar-sized firms than it is to compare each firm's 
returns with the returns of an exchange-wide index. (This is important to this study because firm 
size varied considerably between and across the samples of corporate blockholders and toehold 
target firms. Moreover, between July 1982 and June 1992, large firms earned about 5. 5 percent 
more per year than small ones (Asinof, 1992)). 
They also demonstrated that no advantage is gained through risk-adjustment procedures if 
size-based decile indices are adopted as the normal performance benchmark. 
Size-based deciles are formed by comparing a firm's common stock market value with the 
common stock market value of other firms that trade on its exchange. The decile 1 firms include 
the smallest 10 percent of the firms and the decile 10 firms include the largest 10 percent of the 
firms. A firm's size decile is the decile that includes the firm: hence, its peer group is composed of 
firms of similar size. Because the market value of each firm's common stock changes from year 
to year, a firm's decile may change from year to year, but during a calendar year a firm's decile 
remains constant. 
The daily total return of a size decile is determined by averaging the daily total returns of 
the firms in the decile. The size-based decile index return is thus a benchmark for normal 
performance because it is the average return for firms of similar size. 
The Market Adjusted Model 
A total return from a stock investment indicates the value of cash dividends and capital 
appreciation (loss) in a time interval divided by the original investment. The market-adjusted 
model computes a firm's abnormal return by subtracting from each firm's total return a 
benchmark measure for the firm's expected (or normal) total return. 
The abnormal return Ujst of security j from the start of period s to the end of period t is 
simply 
Ujst = Rjst - E(Rmst) 
where E<Rmst) is a return from an index of firms traded on the same exchange as the subject firm 
(Dimson & Marsh, 1986, 119). The total return Rjst depends on the effect of the event being 
investigated, while the expected return E(Rmsr) is the return that would be anticipated had no 
event occurred. 
TABLE 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Variables Means Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Corporate 
Blockholder 9.58 59.09 1.00 
Performance 
2. Toehold 
Target -9.82 70.18 .23 1.00 
Performance 
3. Investment 
.25t Size 15.32 26.21 .16 1.00 
Ratio 
4. Toehold 
.27t Target 0.11 0.31 .12 - .06 1.00 
Divestiture 
5. Horizontal 
.27t Trade 0.17 0.38 - .24 -.03 .21 1.00 
Relationship 
6. Vertical 
Trade 0.19 0.40 .29* .19 -.03 .01 . -.17 1.00 
Relationship 
7. High Other 
Blockholder 0.12 0.34 .16 -.02 -.16 -.13 -.13 -.02 1.00 
Ownership 
8. LowOther 
Blockholder 0.74 0.44 .10 .23 .09 .04 .20 -.09 - .65** 1.00 
Ownership 
9. Private 
- .28t Placement 0.68 0.47 - .05* - .06 - .36* -.06 .22 .13 -.19 1.00 
10. High Toehold 
Target Insider 0.12 0.34 .16 .33* .11 - .13 -.13 -.19 .04 -.07 -.15 1.00 
Ownership 
11. Low Corporate 
- .25t .26t Blockholder 0.68 0.47 .10 - .22 .24 -.06 -.13 -.19 -.27 .13 1.00 
Ownershi 
t p <.10 • p < .05 **p < .01 
.. . 
TABLE2 
Multivariate tests of association a 
Stepdown Analysis 
Independent Will<'s F Probability Dependent Variables F Probability 
Categorical Lambda Value ofa Value ofa 
Variables Statistic Greater F Greater F 
Horizontal Trade Relationship 0.90 2.03 0.14 Corporate Blockholder 0.92 0.34 
Toehold Target 3.08 0.09 
Vertical Trade Relationship 0.73 6.62 0.00 Corporate Blockholder 7.13 0.01 
Toehold Target 7.15 0.01 
Private Placement 0.99 0.22 0.81 Corporate Blockholder 0.15 0.70 
Toehold Target 0.29 0.59 
High Insider Ownership 0.76 5.69 0.01 Corporate Blockholder 4.73 0.04 
Toehold Target 7.52 0.01 
Low Corporate Blockholder Ownership 0.79 4.72 0.02 Corporate Blockholder 6.83 0.01 
Toehold Target 2.44 0.13 
8The number of degrees of freedom and the density degrees of freedom in each case were 2 and 36, respectively. 
TABLE3 
Regression Estimates on 18-month Abnormal Returns 
(I-statistics are in 12arentheses) 
Corporate Blockholders Toehold Targets 
Ordinary Weighted a Ordinary Weighted a 
Least Least Least Least 
Squares Squares Squares Squares 
Intercept -34.66 -13.39 -139.32 -146.36 
(-1.06) (-0.49) (-3.36)** (-4.49)••• 
• Investment Size Ratio 0.19 0.11 0.76 t 0.78 
(0.59) (0.30) (l.83) (2.44)* 
Toehold Target Divestiture 51.86 t 49.44 -29.03 -11.70 
(l.91) (l.37) (-0.84) (-0.45) 
Horizontal Trade Relationship -23.90 -24.82 55.50 t 43.16 
(-0.96) (-1.19) (l.75) (l.06) 
Vertical Trade Relationship 51.01 40.73 t 64.94 
0
55.36 
(2.67)* (l.83) (2.67)* (3.41)** 
High Other Blockholder Ownership 104.99 105.99 51.87 44.60 
(3.62)*** (4.61)*** (l.41) (2.30)* 
Low Other Blockholder Ownership 62.34 56.32 70.57 69.40 
(2.82)** (2.63)* (2.51)* (4.17)••• 
Private Placement -7.06 -28.20 12.49 5.32 
(-0.39) (-2.30)* (0.54) (0.26) 
High Insider Ownership 49.25 41.85 78.90 74.86 
(2.18)* (2.58)* (2.74)** (3.47)*** 
Low Corporate Blockholder Ownership -48.09 -47.19 36.55 55.10 
(-2.61)* (-2.84)* (l.56) (2.33)* 
Df 37 37 37 37 
F 3.58** 4.75*** 2.61* 5.23** 
R2 .47 .54 .39 .56 
Adjusted R2 .34 .42 .24 .45 
a The weighting factor for the weighted 'least squares estimates is the reciprocal of the squared errors. 
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